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Regularization methods (ridge, lasso and 
elastic net) 
Interbank markets 
a b s t r a c t   
In financial stability, it is essential to know the determinants of interest rates in interbank markets because 
they are important vehicles for liquidity allocation among banks and are relevant for monetary policy 
transmission. Recent research indicates that banks with excess liquidity exercise their market power by 
rationing liquidity during periods of financial stress. This confirms the value of knowing the banks con-
nections and identifying liquidity spreaders in such markets to manage contagion risk, liquidity hoarding 
and to preserve financial stability. In addition to well studied bank features such as size, liquidity and credit 
risk, we study which network metrics relate to interest rates during different periods. Using transaction 
level data on unsecured and secured lending, we apply an approach that employs network theory, 
econometric models and machine learning to analyze the structural properties of the secured and un-
secured interbank markets in Mexico. Our findings support the “too-interconnected-to-fail” hypothesis. In 
the secured interbank market, PageRank shows a relationship with interest rates, while metrics associated 
with the notion of influence and systemic risk (Katz and DebtRank) are relevant in the unsecured interbank 
market. In general, a bank with high centrality lends at higher rates and gets funding at lower rates. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
CC_BY_NC_ND_4.0   
1. Introduction 
This analysis presents evidence that can be useful for determining if 
the position of a financial institution in a network relates to the price of 
its funding and to the price it charges for the liquidity that offers in the 
market. Interbank markets, both secured and unsecured, represent 
important vehicles for liquidity transmission and are essential for the 
transmission of monetary policy. The secured interbank market is the 
market for repurchase agreements (repos); the unsecured interbank 
market is the short-term lending market (hereafter, secured and un-
secured markets). To provide an initial comparison between the two 
markets, the volume traded in the secured market is as much as four 
times that of the unsecured market. 
Additionally, we perform our analysis on the secured and un-
secured Mexican interbank markets because of their importance 
within the funding structure of the Mexican banking system. 
Because both markets represent important vehicles for liquidity 
transmission and contagion, the analysis relates to monetary policy 
implementation and financial stability. Our research contributes to 
the innovative literature that uses networks and econometric 
models in combination, as in Ductor et al. (2014), thus providing 
more tools to understand these important markets. Econometric and 
network models are important tools in the policy decision-making 
processes with objectives such as the pursuit of financial stability, 
adequate monetary policy transmission, and the elaboration of 
stress-testing frameworks. 
Specifically, we analyze the relationship between interest rate 
spreads and structural properties (resorting to financial networks) in 
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the Mexican overnight secured and unsecured interbank markets. 
Where an interest rate spread is the difference between the interest 
rate on each transaction in a particular day in the interbank market, 
and the market weighted average of all the transactions in that day, 
as defined in Temizsoy et al. (2017). The interbank interest rate 
spread has been studied from different perspectives, such as with 
respect to macroeconomic and microeconomic outlooks. In the 
present study, our focus is on centrality metrics that provide in-
formation about the structural relationships among lenders and 
borrowers. It is also essential to study the interbank interest rate 
spread or cost of intermediation, which has important implications 
for the analysis of systemic risk in the Mexican interbank markets 
and financial stability, in the sense implied, for example, in Acharya 
et al. (2012) and León et al. (2018). 
We calculate financial network metrics from monthly aggregated 
data that contains the total amount of money borrowed between 
each pair of institutions in a given month. These matrices are con-
structed using transaction-level regulatory data from the Central 
Bank of Mexico’s databases. This database makes it possible to ob-
tain detailed information on the bilateral transactions of banks in 
both markets. We aggregated daily data to obtain monthly in-
formation, as suggested by Finger et al. (2013). An aggregation pro-
cess across time is useful for uncovering meaningful relationships to 
define the networks and, as a consequence, to obtain more robust 
and less noisy centrality metrics for the econometric analysis, as a 
single-day network could be very different from that of the previous 
and following days. 
For our analysis, we selected a set of variables that cover not only 
the most important structural aspects of financial networks, but also 
each institution’s contributions to them. As an exploratory analysis, 
first we estimated correlations, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
test, ordinary least squares with and without controls, models with 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and Generalized Linear 
Models (GLM) with machine learning fundamentals. All those spe-
cifications were used to determine whether there is a relationship 
between the network metrics and the interest rate spread for each 
market. The correlations and the VIF analysis provided insights into 
the information contained in the set of variables, while the econo-
metric models provided the fundamental variables that are related 
to the interest rate spread robustly. 
Here, we present a model that corrects for multicollinearity and 
provides the main centrality metrics that relate to the interest rate 
spread, which is the paper’s main objective. We present and analyze 
the regularized methods using machine learning techniques (for 
training, validation, and testing data sets). We obtained robust 
models with regularization techniques: Ridge, Lasso and Elastic Net. 
In short, we observed similar results in all the estimated models, 
which indicates the robustness of our conclusions. 
We show the results of the models by type of metric and by fi-
nancial stress period. The results of the GLM model presented in-
cludes control variables (transaction ratio, stress index, delinquency 
ratio and capital ratio). The transaction ratio and stress index vari-
ables are more relevant for the secured market, whereas the trans-
action ratio is relevant for the unsecured market. The periods 
analyzed are as follows: full sample period, pre-Lehman default 
period crisis period, European crisis (relatively stable period for 
Mexico); uncertainty about the rescue program for Greece; the 
period of the minutes about the reduction in the assets purchase 
program (a relatively calm period for Mexico) and the period at the 
end of the asset purchase program (a more stressful period for 
Mexico). We discuss the respective results in detail in Section 4. 
In general, if we compare the estimated results for the secured 
and unsecured markets, we find that global and local network me-
trics relate to the interest rate spread. In the majority of the speci-
fications, the signs of the coefficients and their magnitude suggest 
that being central in the secured and unsecured network conveys 
important benefits in terms of interest rates. This reinforces the ar-
gument about being “too interconnected to fail” (TITF).2 PageRank is 
highly relevant in both markets. This centrality metric implies that a 
bank’s importance also depends on the importance of the banks 
connected to it. Thus, a bank that is systemically important or TITF 
can charge higher interest rates and secure funding at lower rates. 
The results are important for financial stability because in per-
iods of financial stress, banks with excess liquidity exert market 
power by rationing liquidity, as documented in Acharya et al. (2012) 
and León et al. (2018). This highlights the importance of researching 
the interconnection of banks in financial stability, because there are 
liquidity super-spreaders and super-hoarders. Therefore, banks’ po-
sitions on the interbank networks make them possible propagators 
of solvency, monetary policy transmission facilitators and possible 
drivers of contagion risk. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we 
present a short review of the existing literature. Section 3 contains a 
statistical and comparative analysis of the interbank markets ana-
lyzed, as well as, an analysis of the variables we used in the 
econometric models, including the interest rate spread (dependent 
variable), the financial and network metrics (independent variables) 
and the variables used as controls. In brief, this section shows the 
importance of studying the markets and presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables being studied. Section 4 contains the 
econometric analysis, the results of the estimated regularized GLMs 
by periods, the interpretation of the results and possible policy 
implications in the context of financial stability in the Mexican in-
terbank market. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions and 
possible extensions of this research. 
2. Literature review 
This section presents the state of the art concerning the topic 
under study. In this paper, we are interested in the relationship 
between the place (centrality) occupied by each bank in the inter-
bank network and the price the bank pays or charges in the inter-
bank market. Previous analyses have demonstrated that an 
institution’s position in the network relates to the volume and the 
interest rate of unsecured loans, as in Temizsoy et al. (2015), Afonso 
and Lagos (2015), and Bräuning and Fecht (2017). Although some 
papers have already studied the determinants of rates in interbank 
markets, we study the unsecured and secured interbank markets 
simultaneously and use a wider range of network metrics. From this 
body of work, we can distinguish two strands in the literature: 
trading relationships and network centrality. Then, we combine the 
analysis of financial networks with econometric models and ma-
chine learning techniques to provide evidence concerning which 
network properties relate to the interest rate spreads in the un-
secured and secured interbank markets. 
From the research line on trading relationships, using data for 
transfers sent and received by banks in the Fedwire Funds Service,  
Afonso et al. (2013) found that banks rely less on non-recurring 
transactions, for liquidity purposes and more on funds from in-
stitutions with which they have stable financing relationships. 
Overall, borrowers obtain a better price when trading with frequent 
lenders. Afonso and Lagos (2015) analyzed the market for Federal 
Funds, an over-the-counter (OTC) market, for unsecured loans of the 
dollar reserves that each bank keeps at the Federal Reserve Bank. 
Loans are mostly overnight, and their purpose is to reallocate re-
serves among banks. The authors developed a model to characterize 
such a market, taking into account the distinct features of an 
2 The “Too interconnected to fail” hypothesis holds that institutions which are TITF 
benefit from their position in the network regardless of credit risk or other related 
characteristics. 
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unsecured market, and applied it to answer relevant questions re-
garding prevalent trading relationships and the effectiveness of 
some policies for this market. While, Han and Nikolaou, (2016) in-
vestigated the influence of trading relationships in another market. 
Using data from the US tri-party repo market (TPR) from September 
2012 to June 2015, they provided evidence that although trading 
parties conduct transactions with a large number of counterparts, 
they tend to trade with a small set of such counterparts. Conse-
quently, they allocate large volumes to these counterparts. Further-
more, stable relationships with the same counterparts on other 
funding markets have a positive effect on counterpartie’s relation-
ships in the TPR market. These affect the probability of trading and 
the terms of such trade. 
About network studies also exist for the Market for Federal 
Funds. Bech and Atalay (2010) found that the market underlying 
network is sparse (a common characteristic of financial networks, 
such as the ones we study here). The authors found evidence of the 
small-world phenomenon and highly disassortative behavior. They 
also stressed the importance of centrality to rate prediction. Some 
other studies that focused on networks, interbank markets and fi-
nancial stability are: León et al. (2018), Battiston and Martinez- 
Jaramillo (2018), Constantin et al. (2018), Silva et al. (2018, 2016a) 
and Caceres-Santos et al. (2020). 
In particularly, Temizsoy et al. (2015) studied the impact of 
lending relationships in the e-MID interbank market (an electronic 
platform for interbank deposits and loans in the euro area and in the 
United States). Using a panel regression they found that long-term 
relationships exist between banks and have a positive impact on the 
rates and volume for lending and borrowing. Bräuning and Fecht 
(2017) presented similar results for the German interbank market 
during the financial crisis. We found similar evidence for the inter-
bank markets in Mexico. In addition to studying two important 
funding markets and estimating methods with machine learning 
fundamentals, another innovation in our work, in comparison to  
Gabrieli (2012) and Temizsoy et al. (2017) is the incorporation of a 
binary variable for whether an institution belongs to the core, ac-
cording to the model presented in Craig and von Peter (2014). In the 
context of interbank markets, banks in the core play the role of 
intermediaries, whereas banks in the periphery interact as lenders 
or borrowers through the core banks. 
An important issue in this literature is the impact of the network 
structure, specifically regarding how the centrality3 of market par-
ticipants relates to rates. Regarding studies about the e-MID inter-
bank market, Barucca and Lillo, (2016) proposed a method for 
classifying networks according to their structure and applied it to 
the e-MID interbank market. They found that when the degree of the 
nodes is taken into account, a bipartite structure emerges. However,  
Nowicki and Snijders, (2001) used Stochastic Block Models (SBMs) 
on aggregated (over a week-old) data and found that the network 
presents a core-periphery structure Craig and von Peter, (2014). 
More research has been done on the interbank e-MID market, as 
it is one of the few interbank markets with available transaction- 
level data. Iori et al. (2008) performed a network analysis of this 
market and found clear evidence of structural changes over time 
(from 1999 to 2002), alongside a quasi-scale-free network displaying 
a degree distribution with a heavier tail than a random network. One 
study in the same line of research, which we analyze here, is Iori 
et al. (2014). The authors conducted an analysis of the determinants 
of spreads on the e-MID by accounting for the behavior of banks and 
market microstructure. They found that liquidity cost suffers sig-
nificant variations due to the sensitivity of rates and the time of 
trading. Therefore, the spread is proportional to the trading volume 
at the beginning of the trading day. In other words, trading becomes 
more expensive for borrowers in the morning and more beneficial 
for lenders by the end of the trading day. Quoters, regardless of their 
positions as lenders or borrowers, obtain better rates by trading 
higher volumes. 
Another relevant work is Finger et al. (2013), in which the authors 
assessed the effect of aggregation concerning the e-MID market. The 
results indicate that the network obtained from daily data has an 
almost random behavior, and there is no evidence on the true un-
derlying network structure for the market. However, aggregating 
longer time periods reveals a non-random structure of the market. 
Thus, it is fundamental to provide evidence that an aggregation pro-
cess might be useful for uncovering a significant structure. In the case 
of Mexican markets, data aggregation for more extended periods also 
reduces the error on the fit of the core-periphery structure, thus we 
also use monthly-aggregated data. As in the previously cited studies, 
we consider only overnight transactions. 
Regarding the importance of study periods in this matter,  
Gabrieli (2012) investigated the role of network centrality on the 
determinants of interest rates. The study used data from the e-MID 
interbank market from January 2006 to November 2008. Even 
though the study included the major distress period of the financial 
crisis, it would have been interesting to study a more extended 
period to assess a transition to calmer periods. The results show that 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers had a significant effect on the 
market, which is in line with the results presented in Martinez- 
Jaramillo et al. (2014). Before the crisis, reputation and risk per-
ception were the most relevant factors for determining interest 
rates, and there was no clear advantage to benefit from centrality or 
size. However, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, inter-
connectedness of institutions measured by centrality became im-
portant, but with a negative coefficient, which means that the 
markets became much more aware of the risk of being highly con-
nected in a period of distress. In addition, reputation became sig-
nificantly more important. 
Most of the studies mentioned above involve only interbank 
unsecured lending markets. In this research, we examine another 
essential liquidity source in Mexico, the secured market, also known 
as the repo market. Thus, a contribution more of our study is the 
analysis of both markets (the unsecured and secured interbank 
markets). Another study of a market that examined the impact of the 
network structure on interbank rates is Craig et al. (2015), in which 
the authors matched credit exposure data of German banks, from 
2000 to 2008, with data from the repo auctions of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). They found that banks borrowing from a di-
versified set of institutions faced less pressure in the auctions and 
did not consider paying higher rates to obtain liquidity from the ECB. 
Regarding the network structure, Craig et al. (2015) showed that 
central lenders place more aggressive offers in ECB auctions. This 
suggests that central lenders in the money market reallocated funds 
from repo auctions, and that systemically important banks paid 
higher rates for liquidity to continue their intermediation activities. 
In the line of studies applied to Mexico, Usi-López et al. (2017) 
provided an exhaustive description of this crucial funding market for 
commercial banks, brokerage houses, and development banks in 
Mexico. They also analyzed the network structure of the market, 
showing that connectivity has decreased in the interbank secured 
markets, partly because the number of banks has increased. 
Usi-López et al. (2017) also found that the network presents a high 
clustering coefficient despite its low density. This can have a positive 
impact on the liquidity flow in the market, if the interpretation that  
Silva et al. (2016b) gave to the clustering coefficient is considered 
3 Freeman (1978) introduced the concept of centrality in social networks, which 
can be extended to many other networks, particularly financial networks. Bonacich 
(1987) further discussed centrality and its relation with the power that a participant 
has in a network. Babus (2016) presents a theoretical model for explaining how fi-
nancial networks are formed endogenously and how these are related to sys-
temic risk. 
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(that is to say, how easy it is to substitute a liquidity provider). 
Another relevant feature of the interbank secured market in Mexico, 
found in Usi-López et al. (2017), is the absence of a core-periphery 
structure. Finally, the authors found strong disassortative mixing in 
the network, meaning that banks with a small degree tend to con-
nect with banks with large degree. 
Using exposures data for the Mexican interbank market and from 
the Electronic Interbank Payments System (SPEI), Martinez-Jaramillo 
et al. (2014) explore various network centrality metrics and pro-
posed a unified centrality metric that captures the most favorable 
properties of some widely used centrality metrics. A result from  
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) is that there are important outliers 
in the relationship between a bank’s interconnectedness (its cen-
trality) and its size, which are important to identify for financial 
stability purposes. Centrality is closely related to the contagion that 
it might cause in a financial network. When considering the flow of 
funds in the interbank network, interconnectedness and centrality 
have important implications for the dispersion of funds. 
Finally, in the literature that contributes with financial stability 
analysis, we found the research of Poledna et al., (2015), who used 
daily frequency data on exposures from 2007 to 2013; they quanti-
fied the contribution to systemic risk of four different exposure 
networks (credit, derivatives, foreign exchange, and securities) at the 
individual and the aggregated level. The authors show that focusing 
on individual layers underestimates systemic risk by up to 90%.  
Poledna et al., (2021) stress the importance on indirect inter-
connections, which can be an essential driver of financial contagion. 
Indirect interconnections come from overlapping portfolios, that is, 
portfolios with the same securities. Poledna et al., (2021) show that 
very similar portfolios are prone to amplify losses if one of the si-
milar positions is liquidated, producing a shock on the price. 
For the above, we analyze the effect of network metrics on the 
interest rate spread in the secured and unsecured markets. One 
reason we decided to consider more than one liquidity market 
comes from the development of multiplex financial networks. Many 
state-of-the-art studies on financial networks claim that minimizing 
the importance of the complexity of the interaction between in-
stitutions leads to a severe underestimation of systemic risk. This 
complexity stems from the fact that banks interact in different 
markets, and with a wide range of different instruments. Moreover, 
the interbank repo market in Mexico is a market that presents 
higher volume than its unsecured counterpart and follows closely 
the reference rate. To describe the structure of the interbank markets 
studied in this research, we present a statistical analysis of them in 
the next section. 
3. Statistical analysis and methods 
Using a comprehensive data-set from the Central Bank of Mexico,  
Usi-López et al. (2017) described the repo market in Mexico over a 
long period that includes the financial crisis, which started in 2007. 
The secured market in Mexico is very active, with around 60,000 
transactions processed every day in 2016, and a daily average vo-
lume of 35 million Mexican pesos. Most of the activity comes from 
overnight transactions that constitute more than 95% of total 
transactions. The most important types of counterparties are do-
mestic individuals and domestic companies, whose contribution 
amounts to more than 90% of the total number of transactions. 
However, in terms of the volume of the transactions, other coun-
terparts (such as investment funds, commercial banks, and 
brokerage houses) contribute the most –more than 60%– compared 
with domestic firms. 
In Fig. 1, we see the structure of the main deposits of commercial 
banks in Mexico. We constructed the chart with regulatory balance 
sheet data obtained from an institutional repository at the Central 
Bank of Mexico. Sight deposits and term deposits account for more 
than 50% of the total system financing. In second place comes the 
secured transactions, which constitute more than 85% of these two 
types of interbank funding, leaving the unsecured market with only 
about 10%. 
If we compare the above information concerning the total li-
abilities of the banking system, we see that repurchase agreements 
represent between 15% and 20% of total liabilities, versus 5% for the 
unsecured market. This information was obtained from public bal-
ance sheet data from the National Banking and Securities 
Commission (CNBV, acronym in Spanish). 
Regarding volume, the importance of the secured market is also 
evident. In Fig. 1, we can see the proportion of the volume of un-
secured loans (loans without collateral) to secured operations. The 
volume of transactions in the secured market is consistently higher, 
up to four times that of the unsecured market. Despite the secured 
market has a slightly lower number of transactions per month, the 
average volume in the secured market is much higher. While the 
average amount in the unsecured market had decreased as of Sep-
tember 2009, the average amount of repurchases had maintained an 
upward trend (except for a couple of slumps that quickly returned to 
(a) Funding structure (b) Participation of each market in banking
activity
Fig. 1. Characteristics of the secured and unsecured market. (a) Funding structure of the banking system. This shows the importance of each component of the banking system in 
the funding structure. (b) Participation per market in banking activity. We can see the dynamic of the markets regarding the total. 
Source: Data from the National Banking and Securities Commission (in Spanish, Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores) and the Central Bank of Mexico. 
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earlier levels). The average secured volume became very important 
in the second half of 2009. 
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
We used monthly data4 to built the centrality metrics for the 
unsecured market (52 institutions) from January 2005 to June 2017 
and the secured market database (48 institutions) for the same 
period. Due to the data structure, the data analysis allowed us to 
study the heterogeneity of the institutions over time for the two 
markets. 
The centrality and other relevant metrics estimated in this paper 
are: Accessibility, Affinity, Betweenness, Core-Periphery, Closeness, 
Clustering, Cross-Clique, DebtRank, Degree, DebtRank Vulnerability, 
Entropic Eigenvector Centrality (EEC), Eigenvector, Expected force, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Katz centrality, PageRank, 
Participation ratio (Part)5, Percolation, SinkRank and Strenght. “L” 
after the name of the centrality network means lender and a “B” 
means borrower. See Section 1 of the supplementary information to 
find a detailed definition of each centrality metric. 
Regarding the centrality metrics of the unsecured interbank 
market, for example in Fig. 1 of section 2 in the supplementary in-
formation, we show the evolution of strength that exhibits a clear 
upward trend for the entire distribution. We also show the evolution 
of the betweenness centrality distribution, which also has an up-
ward distribution trend that could be linked to the presence of more 
links in this market. Further, we show distributions of the secured 
interbank market across time. Fig. 2 of section 2 in the supple-
mentary information depicts the weighted version of Katz centrality. 
The distribution steadily declined until the fall of Lehman Brothers, 
after which it remained low. 
Degree and entropic eigenvector centrality can be seen in Figs. 1 
and 2 of section 2 in the supplementary information. The evolution 
of the degree distribution has not undergone any major changes; 
despite the entry of new banks to the markets, banks on average 
connect to around eight counterparts, thus the crisis seems to have 
had little effect on this metric. It is important to note that the dis-
tribution of strengths for the secured interbank market (Fig. 2 of 
section 2 in the supplementary information) is at a considerably 
higher level than that of the unsecured interbank market (Fig. 1 of 
section 2 in the supplementary information). Regarding the statistics 
and the plots of the metrics, in general, there is an apparent increase 
in centrality that we consider to be linked to an increase in system 
connectivity, except for the case of weighted Katz centrality in the 
secured market. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the spread across 
time for both interbank markets (unsecured and secured). For the 
unsecured market, we can observe that the spread has an upward 
trend until the default of Lehman Brothers (vertical dotted line). 
After this event, the distribution shifts downwards for a period until 
it collapses at close to zero for a short period at the end of 2010. 
Since then, the distribution has had a substantial mass below zero. 
Meanwhile, the secured market spread distribution shows fasci-
nating behavior. At the beginning of the study period, it was well 
above zero, and then it declined until just before the Lehman default. 
Then, for a brief period lasting only a few days, it declined sharply 
(a possible explanation for these phenomena is a flight-to-quality 
episode); after that it went up again and stayed above zero for a 
period. Finally, at the end of 2010, the distribution shows a 
downward trend until the end of the study period. 
3.2. Statistical modeling of variables 
We built the data sets (one per market) from the existence of a 
transaction between two institutions. The spread is calculated as the 
difference, between the rate at which each transaction was agreed 
during the month and the weighted average rate of the entire system 
in the same period. Therefore, if two institutions interacted within 
the month, there is a spread, and this is present in the data set. It is 
important to consider that in every transaction in both markets, one 
institution registers the transaction as an asset and the other reg-
isters it as a liability; this means that one institution lends money 
(lender) and another receives it (borrower). The data sets contains 
measures of the activity of each institution as a borrower and as a 
lender in the network, regardless of its role in the specific spread. 
The dependent variable, the interest rate spread is calculated as 
suggested Temizsoy et al. (2017). We calculate the monthly volume- 
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Fig. 2. Unsecured and secured interbank markets. These graphs show the dynamics of the distribution of interest rate spreads. a) Unsecured, b) Secured. 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
4 The database contains daily transactional data; for a detailed explanation of the 
aggregation process used to convert this to monthly data, see Section 2 of the sup-
plementary information. 
5 The participation ratio, which is not considered among the classic centrality 
metrics, is the ratio of the amount of money that passed by a node to the total money 
that moved in the totality of the network. 
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rij.n and vij,n being the transaction-level interest rate outstanding and 
the volume of the transaction, respectively, for each pair of banks ij 
where i ≠ j. Nij,t is the number of transactions for the bank pair ij 
where i ≠ j at period t and n refers to the transaction. Finally, r̄m
d is the 
daily average-weighted interest rate over all transactions carried out 
by all bank pairs. 
For the calculation of the network measures is helpful to re-
present the network connections in matrix form. We denote this 
matrix by W, with its entries wij ≥ 0 representing the amount of 
money that institution j borrows from institution i, that is, an in-
teraction in which institution j is the borrower and institution i is the 
lender. Given that an institution cannot borrow money from itself, 
wii = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, …, N}, where N is the number of institutions re-
presented in W. By accounting for the direction of money flows in 
the network, we can define two additional matrices: the outflow 
matrix W+ and the inflow matrix W−. Accordingly, the entry +wij
defines a money flow from institution i to institution j and the entry 
wij defines a money flow from institution j to institution i: this 
implies that W = W+ + W− and =+W W( )T . Some of the network 












There are also in and out adjacency matrices A+ and A−, defined 
by analogy to W+ and W−, which implies that A = A+ + A− and 
=+A A( )T . On this basis, the network measures we consider in our 
study are calculated as fully described in Section 1 of the supple-
mentary information. For a characterization of every financial me-
tric, see Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014). 
We consider several additional control variables to account for 
some co-effects that could affect the impact of the network mea-
sures mentioned above. For the secured and unsecured markets, we 
use the transaction ratio, the regulatory capital ratio, the de-
linquency ratio, and the am_pm ratio (only for the secured market). 
Transaction ratio identifies significant relationships in the mar-
kets. It is defined as the percentage that represents the number of 
operations between each pair of institutions in the data set, with 
respect to the total number of operations on a given date. If the value 
is close to one, it means that the majority of the operations com-
pleted in a period occurred between this pair of institutions. 
Capital ratio measures the ratio of assets to debt and represents 
the amount of losses that can be absorbed by the capital of each 
bank such that 
=Regulatory capital ratio Core capital
Risk  Weighted assets (4)  
Ratio AM/PM represents the percentage of operations that occur 
in two different partitions of a day of activity (before and after 
1:00 pm). We calculate the ratio as: 
=Ratio AM
PM
Morning operations Evening operations
Total operations in the day (5)  
If the ratio has a negative value, it means that the number of 
transactions arranged after one o′clock in the afternoon is higher 
than the number of morning operations. This is motivated by the 
findings in Baglioni and Monticini (2008) who found a decreasing 
trend in the rate as the day progressed. 
Finally, delinquency ratio is a measure of the quality of a bank’s 
loan portfolio. This metric is used as a proxy for credit risk of the 
counterpart. The formula used for its calculation is: 
=Delinquency ratio Amount of delinquent loans
Total amount of current loans (6)  
In summary, first we calculated the spread, as suggested in  
Temizsoy et al. (2017), and the centrality metrics of the network 
obtained from the secured and unsecured markets. Given that we 
are analyzing the unsecured market in Mexican pesos, we refer only 
to transactions that occurred in the domestic currency in the secured 
market for the sake of consistency. 
We specify the following convention in the names of the vari-
ables: variable name - position spread, where “position spread” can 
be B or L, depending on whether the institution is a borrower or 
lender in the transactions considered for computing the spread. In 
Section 3 of the supplementary information, we present a correla-
tion analysis between the variables, and in Section 4 of the supple-
mentary information a multicollinearity analysis for the complete 
period, to observe how the financial metrics are related to each 
other. This paper presents only the results from regularization 
techniques and GLM (Ridge, Lasso, and Elastic Net); however, many 
specifications were estimated for the sake of verifying the robust-
ness of our results and are presented in the supplementary in-
formation. 
3.3. Econometric modeling 
The econometric analysis performed includes the correlation test 
(VIF), as well as different specifications using the GMM model. In 
addition, some regularization techniques from the GLM models were 
used, namely: Ridge, Lasso, and Elastic Net. The GLM models with 
machine learning fundamentals were used to train the models, from 
which we present the results in the following sections, alongside the 
definitions of the implemented models. 
Estimating GLM models using machine learning techniques 
makes it possible to obtain robust models, to treat the multi-
collinearity issue (which is useful, since we are interested in se-
lecting the centrality measures that best explain the interest rate 
spread in the interbank market), and consequently, to obtain better 
models in case we need to make predictions. And most importantly, 
estimating GLM models using machine learning techniques allows 
for splitting the data in training and testing sets, helping us to avoid 
overfitting in the models. We present the generic formulation of the 
regularized models. 




j ij1 0 1 , 
where β = (β1, …, βp), λ ≥ 0, and = =( ) ( )j
p
j j1 is the increasing 
function of penalty β, which depends on λ. The family of penalty 
functions used is the norm - Lq = ( )q q. This model provides 
estimators called Ridge. 
First, we present the Ridge regression that has a norm L2 and 
α = 0; then we estimate the Lasso regression of norm L1 and α = 1; 
and, finally the Elastic Net regression that contains the two previous 
cases for α. In the analysis of the results, we compare the λ para-
meter from the three previous methods. 
3.3.1. Ridge regression 
This technique was initially proposed by Hoerl and Kennard 
(1970) to avoid collinearity. The Ridge method shrinks the regression 
coefficients due to the penalty term (λ) in the objective function. If λ 
is higher, the shrinkage is greater. The Ridge specification is 










2 . To clearly 
see the function of λ, we can write the above optimization problem 











2 where λ ≥ 0 and λ is 
determined after the estimation of the coefficients. Once the coef-
ficients have been estimated, the second step is to look for the value 
of λ that minimizes the error estimate of the expected prediction. 
3.3.2. Lasso regression 
The Ridge method tends to shrink coefficients; however, in the 
end there is no selection of variables, which is why Tibshirani 
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(1996) developed the least absolute shrinkage and selection op-










j1 . Rewriting the above expression, we have 










1 where λ ≥ 0 when the 
pairwise correlations are high between predictors. The Ridge 
method is, in general, better than Lasso. Lasso tends to select only 
one variable of the group, but it sometimes matters which one it 
selects. However, as the Lasso method can give a reduction of the 
variance in the trade-off with a small increase in bias, it can 
estimate more accurate predictions. 
3.3.3. Elastic net regression 
The technique of regularization and selection, introduced by Zou 
and Hastie (2005), automatically selects variables and performs 
continuous contraction (Lasso advantage). We adapt this for our 
study and estimate seven alpha values in each model. The specifi-
cation of the problem is as follows: = y Xˆ argminene 2 s.t. α∣β∣1 +  
(1 − α)∣β∣2 ≤ κ for some κ. The Elastic Net penalty is α∣β∣1 + (1 − α)∣β∣2, 
which is a convex combination of the Lasso and Ridge penalties. 
We can rewrite the optimization problem as a simple 












In the next section, we present the results of the GLM models 
with regularization techniques in different periods of financial 
stress. We based the selection of periods on a stress index6 com-
puted at the Central Bank of Mexico. The index is computed with 
relevant market indicators such as the credit default swap spread 
(CDS) of the five-year Mexican bonds and the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (known by its ticker symbol VIX). Fig. 3 
shows the time evolution of this index as well as the selected dates 
that we used to split the sample and to statistically test if banks 
change their behavior at different levels of financial stress. 
4. Results 
In this section we present the main results. In line with the main 
objective of this research, we identify which centrality metrics are 
related to the behavior of the interest rate spread in the secured and 
unsecured interbank markets; that is, we observe if there is evidence 
of systemic risk or connectivity metrics, or other measures of contact 
among banks that relate with the interest rates between lenders and 
borrowers. In the following subsections we present the results for 
the estimated shrinkage methods (Ridge, Lasso and Elastic Net). 
Figures and tables with the estimated results, according to all the 
periods and markets, are found in Section 5 of the supplementary 
material. 
The results of the estimated models for different markets in-
dicate that, in general, several centrality metrics are statistically 
significant and persistent on each of the markets, this allows us to 
identify the network metrics that relate to the spreads, including 
network metrics that are used for systemic risk and financial stabi-
lity purposes. Instead of focusing only on a pre-crisis, during crisis, 
and post-crisis period, we decided to split the sample into several 
periods by taking into account a number of events that lead to 
higher or lower stress in the financial system, as indicated by the 
stress index used at the Central Bank of Mexico. 
We chose the different periods on the basis of a test for the stress 
index and found statistical evidence, both economic and financial, 
that supports the split. As the stress index shows (Fig. 3), there are 
episodes where there was an increase in financial stress and the 
Fig. 3. This graph shows the tested breakpoints in Table 1, those are analyzed as subsamples in the next section. 
Source: Authors, with data from Central Bank of Mexico. 
6 We are grateful to our colleagues from the Financial Stability Directorate in the 
Central Bank of Mexico, who shared the stress index time series with us, in particular, 
we thank Yahir López Chuken. 
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periods following Lehman's default are by no means homogeneous. 
We tested statistically the periods by applying the Chow break-point 
test, where the null hypothesis (no breaks at specified breakpoints) 
is not accepted because the F probability is less than 0.05; thus, we 
found that the proposed dates are breakpoints (Table 1). Fig. 3 shows 
the selected periods based on the statistical test to detect break-
points. The test was performed on the Stress Index that allows us to 
know the periods of marked stress. 
The next subsection shows the results by interbank market (se-
cured and unsecured). The Ridge method was the best method found 
for analyzing the secured market, except during the European crisis 
period, where the Lasso method proved to be better. In Section 7 of 
the supplementary information, we present all results (main de-
terminants of the interest rate spread by periods) for other methods 
(Elastic Net for different values of alpha). For the unsecured market, 
the best model depends on the period. 
4.1. Results of the estimated models for the secured market by period 
For the full sample, we can see that the Ridge method gives the 
minimum Mean Squared Error (MSE), this shows the average 
squared difference between the estimated interest rate spread and 
the real interest rate spread value, also known as the precision error.  
Table 2 shows the MSE alongside the value of log (λ). For the secured 
market, the Ridge method provides the best model with a minimum 
MSE, except for the European crisis period, for which the Lasso is 
better. 
The shrinkage methods, penalized or regularized, set penalties 
for the coefficients to reduce them progressively to zero; only im-
portant coefficients are found with the minimum variance model. 
For the secured market, the best regression is obtained using the 
Ridge method with the penalty parameter. 
In Fig. 4 panel (a), the curves present the centrality metrics 
against the L-norm of the whole coefficient vector, when λ takes 
different values. The axis number above indicates the nonzero 
coefficients at the current value of λ; we can therefore observe that 
the majority of the variables are close to zero, and five variables 
significantly affect the variability of the interest rate spread in the 
full sample in the secured market. We can detect from Fig. 4 panel 
(b) that when the penalty is high (λ grows from 0 → ∞), the coeffi-
cients will be zero or close to zero, in this sense the plot shows the 
coefficients against log(λ). Fig. 4 panel (c) shows the deviation of the 
fraction explained by the variables, and panel (d) shows the evolu-
tion of the test error (MSE) for different values of log(λ), the red 
dotted curve is the cross-validation curve with upper and lower 
standard deviation and the log(λ)s are indicated by the vertical line, 
enabling us to see the best lambda with the minimum MSE. We also 
estimate predictions based on the fitted models, which are close to 
the selection of real variables. The estimated models can learn the 
complex patterns of the variables, with the penalization mechanism 
reducing overfitting; this gives us robust models. The figures by 
subsamples and methods for both the secured and unsecured mar-
kets are provided in section 6 of the supplementary information. 
For the secured market, the results by period show that around 
five centrality metrics are significant in different periods (see  
Fig. 5).7 During the first three periods, most of those five metrics 
of centrality are important. We can also observe that borrowing 
and lending network metrics are compatible with the TITF 
hypothesis; in general, in all the periods in this market, being 
central is linked to cheaper access to liquidity and better lending 
conditions. 
During the pre-Lehman period, the centrality metrics that relate 
to the interest rate spread were: PageRank_B (-), PageRank_L (+), 
Katz_cent_B (-), part_B (+), and HHI_L_B(-). The results for PageRank, 
Katz and Participation ratio (how important an institution is as a 
funds provider or funds taker) are the most relevant financial me-
trics for relating to the interest rate spread; this supports the TITF 
hypothesis. Particularly, we see that PageRank_L implies that lenders 
assume importance in line with the relevance of banks connected to 
their network; the banks’ importance has a positive effect on spread, 
and banks charge higher than market average interest rate. In sum, 
we observe that in this period, if a bank is systemically important, it 
is reflected in the spread. 
In the crisis period, the main centrality metrics are the same as in 
the pre-crisis period. Thus, in this period, the TITF hypothesis is 
supported. In particular, we find that PageRank_Lenders is the most 
important determinant of the interest rate spread. 
For the European crisis period, PageRank_B is one of the most 
important metrics relating to the spread. Interestingly, Katz and 
Participation ratio have coefficients with positive signs, which 
means higher financing cost for borrowers due to the number of 
lenders and money transactions during this period. 
The fourth period, with the uncertainty about the rescue pro-
gram for Greece, was an interesting one in Mexico. Along with the 
significant concerns about the suitability of the rescue plan for 
Greece, there were major concerns about the Spanish banks, because 
two important subsidiaries in Mexico are Spanish. As a consequence, 
this period can be classified as a period of high financial stress. In the 
model PageRank_L shows a difficult situation for lenders in this 
period. 
The period labeled “Minutes” can also be classified as a period of 
high financial stress, and the borrowers were those that explain 
small movements in the interest rate spread in this period. 
Table 1 
The table shows the results from the Chow break-point test for the dates 2008M09, 
2010M01, 2011M06, 2012M09, 2014M11, and 2017M06. This test shows that the null 
hypothesis (no breaks at specified breakpoints) is not accepted, at 95% confidence and 
for the given sample. Thus, we need to split the study periods to study the re-
lationship between spreads and centrality properly.      
Dates tested: 2008M09 2010M01 2011M06 2012M09 2014M11 2017M06 
Null hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: All equation variables 
Equation sample: 2005M03 2017M12  
F-statistic  2.064807 Prob. F(18,133)  0.0104 
Log likelihood ratio  37.94996 Prob. Chi-Square(18)  0.0039 
Wald Statistic  37.16652 Prob. Chi-Square(18)  0.0050 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico.  
Table 2 
Secured Market_Full period. Comparison between models with different alpha va-
lues (best log(λ) and MSE). This table presents a comparison of the MSE of the 
econometric methods, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and penalized regression 
methods or regularized regressions, with different alpha values. In addition, we 
present the log(λ) with the lowest precision error in this case, for the full period in the 
secured market. The Ridge method has the minimum MSE. Section 5 of the supple-
mentary information shows the MSE and the log(λ), for all the methods, by period and 
market.     
Method MSE Log(λ) with the lowest 
precision error  
OLS  0.017222 – 
Ridge_(alpha = 0)  0.017209 -6.464507 
Lasso_(alpha = 1)  0.017221 -13.37226 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.1)  0.017221 -11.06968 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.25)  0.017221 -11.98597 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.5)  0.017221 -12.40001 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.75)  0.017221 -13.08458 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.95)  0.017221 -13.32097 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico.  
7 The tables with the coefficients are available upon request. 
I.-E. Téllez-León, S. Martínez-Jaramillo, L. Escobar-Farfán et al. Journal of Financial Stability 55 (2021) 100893 
8 
In the last period, HHI_L_B and Katz_cent_B (number of bor-
rowers connected in a transaction) support the TITF hypothesis for 
the borrowers and indicate a lower financing cost for them. 
It appears that a bank with systemic relevance, that is well 
connected, has influence and carries out many financial transactions, 
can charge high interest rates and fund itself at a lower interest rate. 
This involves an important economic policy implication: regulations 
need to focus beyond bank size, and the authorities should consider 
banks’ connections and the number of transactions conducted. In 
terms of the centrality network measures, we found PageRank, Katz 
and Participation ratio (how important an institution is as a funds 
provider or funds taker) to be important for the determination of the 
interest rate spread, in several periods. for the secured interbank 
market. The general picture that emerges is that the TITF hypothesis 
holds for most of the periods, especially in the global periods of fi-
nancial stress, pointing to a change in behavior by the participants in 
this market. 
4.2. Results of the estimated models for the unsecured market period 
For the unsecured market, the best method varies for different 
periods. Table 3 and Fig. 6 show the dynamics in the unsecured 
market for the full sample. The minimum MSE is found in the Elastic 
Net method (α = 0.75). 
Fig. 6 panel (a) shows the nonzero coefficients for this market 
determined by Elastic Net regression (α = 0.75). Those are Eigen-
vector_L, Accessibility_B, and PageRank_B, which are plotted 
versus L-norm. Fig. 6 panel (b) shows the coefficients against 
the log (λ) values; we can observe how the penalty increases when λ 
grows from 0 → ∞. In the unsecured market, a different effect on the 
interest rate spread is found due to the connection relationship. This 
means that the connections are seen as a source of systemic risk 
because of the unsecured market characteristics. The effect on the 
spread due to connectivity could be contrary to that analyzed in the 
secured market, it will depend on the financial stress period. Then, 
Fig. 4. Secured market: Outputs from the Ridge method. These graphs show the outputs from the Ridge method, the method with the lower MSE for the full period in the secured 
market. a) The graph shows the estimated coefficients with different λ values against the L1-norm. b) The plot indicates the regression coefficients against log(λ), c) Here, we can 
see the percentage of deviation explained by training data. d) This plot shows the evolution of the error against every log(λ). Section 6 of the supplementary information shows 
these plots for all the methods according to the market. 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
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the models estimation was made by period too. The graphs by 
subsamples and methods for the secured and unsecured markets are 
in section 6 of the supplementary information. 
We can observe that the effect of connectivity on the interest rate 
spread is different depending on the period. There is a bigger sys-
temic risk in the unsecured market, during financial stress periods. 
In this market, the transaction ratio is a relevant control variable.  
Fig. 6 panel (c) shows the percentage of deviation that is explained 
by the training data. Colored lines only show examples for each 
coefficient, and panel (d) shows the cross-validation curve. We can 
thus observe that regularization of L forces the parameters to be 
close to zero, if they do not have more information to provide than 
the main explanatory variable; therefore, the larger penalty yields a 
robust model. 
The results for the unsecured market by period are represented 
graphically in Fig. 7. There are around six types of centrality metrics 
that relate with the interest rate spread in this market. 
For the pre-Lehman period, we found that PageRank_B indicates 
that the importance of banks connected to a borrower affects their 
dynamics. This means a higher financing cost because of the bank’s 
connections. The systemic risk in this period is very important, as we 
observe a negative effect from PageRank_L, indicating that the len-
ders’ connections affect the bank. This makes sense in an interbank 
market without collateral. 
For the crisis period (October 2008 to February 2010; see Fig. 7), 
there is strong evidence that systemic importance (centrality) ben-
efits lenders and borrowers. In particular, DebtRank_B, Katzcent_B, 
and PageRank_L relate to the spread. This supports the TITF hy-
pothesis because borrowers have a lower funding cost and lenders 
have a positive spread. For a market with more risk, because there is 
no collateral, DebtRank is an important variable to determine the 
interest rate spread. For the Lehman period, there is evidence of the 
benefits of being central for lenders and borrowers, as well as of 
systemic risk affecting the spread. 
Our work provides evidence aligned with the work of Temizsoy 
et al. (2017), who obtained evidence to support their claim that 
centrality plays an essential role in terms of the rates that banks 
obtain on the unsecured money market. Furthermore, this effect 
became more significant during the crisis of 2008, both for the entire 
network and for individual institutions. They provide evidence about 
the TITF hypothesis demonstrating that borrowers obtain better 
rates by positioning themselves as important intermediaries in the 
market. An apparent effect of the crisis is that major lenders were 
able to obtain better rates. However, afterward the opposite hap-
pened; that is, banks became more aware of the risk of being highly 
exposed with very uncovered institutions. 
The European crisis period offers strong evidence supporting the 
TITF, namely, that being central can be beneficial for lenders and 
borrowers. On the borrower side, Katz_cent_B and DebtRank_B in-
dicate borrowers with connections and systemic relevance. While, 
Katz_cent_L and DebtRank_L have a positive effect on interest rate 
spread, this means that lenders with important connections and 
systemic relevance, due to the density in their connections and the 
relevance of their counterparts, can charge higher interest rates and 
obtain financing at a lower interest rate. 
There is a special dynamic in the period we called uncertainty 
about the rescue program for Greece. PageRank is the most important 
centrality measure in this period. The signs mean that borrowers faced 
higher financing cost due to the uncertainty in a market with higher 
systemic risk than in the secured interbank market. The Greece period 
was characterized by uncertainty about the rescue plans for Greece, as 
well as by serious problems in Spanish banks that had effects for the 
Spanish subsidiaries in Mexico. 
Fig. 5. Results by period for the secured interbank market Ridge (α = 0) model. This 
graph shows the centrality metrics from the Ridge method, the method with the 
lowest MSE in the secured market according to different periods. The periods are full 
period (navy blue), pre-Lehman default period (orange), crisis period (gray), European 
crisis period (yellow), uncertainty about the rescue program for Greece (blue), the 
period of the minutes in the reduction in the asset purchase program (green), and the 
end of the asset purchase program (dark blue). Section 7 of the supplementary in-
formation shows the estimation by period according to the other methods. 
For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is 
referred to the web version of this article. 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
Table 3 
Unsecured Market_Full period. Comparison between models with different alpha 
values (best log(λ) and MSE). This table shows the comparison through MSE of the 
econometric methods, as (OLS) and penalized regression methods or regularized re-
gressions, with different alpha values. We also present the log(λ) with the lowest 
precision error, in this case, for the full period in the unsecured market. The Elastic 
Net method with alpha equal to 0.75 has the minimum MSE. Section 5 of the sup-
plementary information shows the MSE and log(λ) for all the methods by period and 
market.     
Method MSE Log(λ) with the least 
precision error  
OLS  0.005735 – 
Ridge_(alpha = 0)  0.005797 −5.270106 
Lasso_(alpha = 1)  0.005682 −10.13112 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.1)  0.005705 −9.22404 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.25)  0.005696 −9.582129 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.5)  0.005681 −9.531006 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.75)  0.005679 −9.843437 
Elastic Net_(alpha = 0.95)  0.005681 0.000042 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico.  
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The fifth period can be considered a less stressed period; we 
called it the minutes period. There are various structural metrics that 
are relevant. It is still important for the lenders to have important 
connections (PageRank_L and Katz_cent_L) and systemic relation-
ships (DebtRank_L); this determines a positive spread. Then, they 
can charge a higher interest rate. DebtRank_B and Katz_cent_B in-
dicate that a relevant borrower can find lower funding cost with 
their counterparts. 
For the last period (Fig. 7), the main centrality measures that 
explain the interest rate spread are Katz and DebtRank. For lenders 
and borrowers, the interconnection and systemic relevance are 
fundamental to determine the interest rate spread. In the unsecured 
market for some periods the interconnections and the systemic re-
levance play in favor or against of the lenders and borrowers, that 
depends on the financial stress period. There is greater sensitivity to 
conditions of financial stress in the unsecured market because this 
market has no collateral. 
For this market, the most important result is that a topological 
centrality metric (PageRank), in some periods, points to a different 
address than a systemic risk metric (DebtRank) does. Our results are 
robust for the many models that were estimated. DebtRank reflects 
the characteristics of the unsecured market by periods. In this 
market, with no collateral, systemic relevance measured by the 
DebtRank centrality metric is consistent with the TITF hypothesis, 
unlike that measured by the PageRank metric. Moreover, most of the 
other centrality metrics point to the same conclusion as DebRank, 
notably Katz centrality. Then, we observed that a researcher or 
monetary authority could analyze the systemic relevance metric to 
study these type of markets, since different conclusions can be made 
if one centrality metric is chosen over the other, in certain markets 
due to their inherent characteristics. We can say that given the 
specific characteristics of the unsecured market, a systemic risk 
metric makes more sense to analyze its relationship with the in-
terest rate spread. This finding is very important in the choice of the 
Fig. 6. Unsecured market: Outputs from Elastic Net (α = 0.75) method. These graphs show the outputs from Elastic Net (α = 0.75) method, the method with the lower MSE for the 
full period in the unsecured market. (a) This graph shows the estimated coefficients with different lambda values against the L1-norm. (b) This plot indicates the regression 
coefficients against log(λ). (c) Here, we can see the percentage of deviation explained by training data. (d) This plot shows the evolution of the error against every log(λ). Section 6 
of the supplementary information shows these plots for all the methods by market. 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
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centrality measure by market and study period, for future financial 
stability analyzes. To study markets without collateral or more 
sensitive to risk in financial stress periods, it is essential to use 
DebtRank. 
In sum, we assess the relationship of local and global network 
metrics with the interest rate spread, we also determine whether 
any of the metrics are relevant in either market, and whether such 
relationship with the interest rate spread is positive or negative. 
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature concerning the re-
lationship of the underlying network structure of the Mexican in-
terbank market. We observe that PageRank and Katz are important 
measures of the financial network for the secured interbank market. 
While DebtRank is fundamental to explain the unsecured interbank 
market because its nature. For both the secured and unsecured 
markets, we see evidence of the TITF hypothesis, with the effect on 
the interest rate spread depending on connections, systemic re-
levance in the markets, and varying according to different periods. In 
general, this means that the banks have a better interest rate spread 
if they connect with central banks in the network, in certain periods. 
5. Conclusions 
We explored the structural properties of the Mexican secured 
and unsecured interbank markets. The purpose of the analysis was 
to discover the relationship between interbank networks and the 
interest rate in such markets. We estimated econometric models 
using different estimation methods: least squares, GMMs, and GLMs 
with machine learning fundamentals. Due to space issues, we only 
present the results of the latter model in this paper. It is important to 
point out that the results of the other models are in line with those 
presented here. We specifically present the results of the regularized 
GLMs by time periods, where we used training, validation, and 
testing data sets. We found that mainly the importance of a bank 
according to the importance of the institutions that are connected to 
it (PageRank) explains the relationships between lenders and bor-
rowers in the Mexican secured interbank market. While a network 
measure that quantifies the node's importance in a system 
(DebtRank) is fundamental to study the interest rate spreads in the 
Mexican unsecured interbank market, because of its nature, it is 
more sensitive to periods of financial stress and systemic risk. These 
results are very important for financial stability. Given that we 
analyzed 20 centrality measures and found which ones explain the 
interest rate spread in the secured and unsecured interbank markets. 
The paper presents in the respective results section, which centrality 
measures explain the interest rate spreads by market (depending on 
their characteristics, secured and unsecured markets) and by 
financial stress periods. This is very important to choose the 
centrality measure that best explains the structure of the studied 
markets when researchers or monetary authorities are analyzing 
financial stability. 
In line with Acharya et al. (2012) and León et al. (2018), knowing the 
interconnection of banks is very important, because they are super- 
spreaders in the interbank markets that influence financial stability.  
Acharya et al. (2012) show how banks with excess liquidity, especially 
during the global financial crisis, exert market power by rationing li-
quidity. This emphasizes the importance of knowing the super-sprea-
ders in an interbank market, as they are possible propagators of 
contagion and the banks that will enable the transmission of monetary 
policy. The study of the issue raised is highly relevant because of the 
implications in terms of financial stability. For example, Acharya et al. 
(2012) point out that liquidity rationing by super-spreaders also oc-
curred before the global financial crisis, such as the collapse of Long- 
Term Capital Management in 1998 and Amaranth Advisors in 2006. 
The relevance of the study in terms of financial stability is also stressed 
in León et al. (2018), who identified the central bank liquidity super- 
spreaders in interbank funds network. 
Our work exhibits the following innovations: 1) The period in-
vestigated is wider than in previous studies, which allows to explore 
different subsamples as financial stress periods. 2) We study two 
important interbank markets using the same approach. This allows 
us to observe what financial network measures are important in a 
market with collateral (less systemic risk, such as a secured inter-
bank market) and in an unsecured market. 3) We include new net-
work metrics and observe that for the unsecured market, those 
explain the interest rate spread for several periods. 
In general, there are five centrality metrics that relate to the interest 
rate spread for the secured market and six for the unsecured market 
from around 20 different network metrics. Moreover, the coefficients 
indicate that higher centrality implies lower rates for borrowers and 
eventually higher rates for lenders. This supports the TITF hypothesis, 
with Katz_cent explaining the interest rate spread in almost all the 
periods and markets. That metric shows the number of all banks that 
can be connected through a path. As well as the TITF hypothesis is 
supported by the metrics results that explain the interest rate spread 
particularly in the secured and unsecured interbank markets, which 
Fig. 7. Results by period, for the unsecured interbank market Elastic Net (α = 0.75) 
model. This graph shows the centrality networks from the Elastic Net (α = 0.75) 
method, the method with the lowest MSE in the unsecured market according to 
period. The periods are full period (navy blue), pre-Lehman default period (orange), 
crisis period (gray), European crisis period (yellow), uncertainty about the rescue 
program for Greece (blue), the minutes period on the reduction in the asset purchase 
program (green), and the end of the asset purchase program (dark blue). “_L” after the 
name of the centrality network means lender and a “_B” means borrower. Section 7 of 
the supplementary information shows the estimation by period according to the 
other methods. For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article. 
Source: Authors, with data from the Central Bank of Mexico. 
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have been explained and refer to PageRank and DebtRank, respectively. 
Importantly, we realized that in the unsecured market, a systemic risk 
measure (such as DebtRank) explains the interest rate spread for dif-
ferent periods, as well as the other results presented in this paper by 
market and periods of financial stress. 
We found that there are important effects of the connections be-
tween lenders and borrowers in the interbank market on the interest 
rate spread. These depend on the financial stress level, the benefits of 
being central, the concentration of the transactions, the systemic re-
levance, the density of the connections, the importance of the counter-
parts connected to the bank, and the number of the banks connected in 
a lending or borrowing path. In particular, immediately after the fall of 
Lehman Brothers, the benefits of being central and connected increased. 
All these results suggest that the place of an institution in the 
network and its connections are beneficial for its funding prices, as 
well as for the price that an institution charges for liquidity in both 
interbank markets. Moreover, banks that play the role of inter-
mediaries obtain lower rates as borrowers and charge higher rates as 
lenders. All of the above support the argument of being “too inter-
connected to fail” (TITF), because a bank that is central or systemic 
can charge higher rates and fund itself at lower rates. 
In sum, the results for different time periods indicate that banks 
change their behavior over time and that splitting the sample has 
important implications for statistical purposes, in terms of financial 
interpretation, in particular for the unsecured market, which has 
higher systemic risk because there is no collateral in such trans-
actions. Specifically, we find that for the unsecured market, 
DebtRank explains the interest rate spread in a greater amount, 
while PageRank describes the interest rate spread in the secured 
market. In addition, in pre-crisis and crisis periods, the network 
measures mentioned above explain the interest rate spread to a 
greater extent. 
A future extension of this study could consider other relevant 
variables, like macroeconomic and financial series, or variables re-
lated to the collateral used in secured transactions. Future work 
could use the same approach to include more intermediaries (for 
example, pension funds, investment funds, and brokerage firms), 
which are relevant non-bank counterparts. It would be interesting to 
see if their centrality in the inter-financial network has an impact on 
their credit conditions in the secured market. 
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